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"No Fault" Takes A French Twist: A




One of the striking developments of modem times has been the
dramatic increase in the number of rules which govern civil liability.
Today, much more than in the past, people seek some person or entity
to shoulder the financial burden whenever the damage occurs. This
increasing exploration into the realm of the "personne responsable" is
creating fissures in the monolith of classical French concepts of liabil-
ity.1 Recent legislation and jurisprudence clearly indicate that French
society is abandoning the notion that a lack of discernment or matur-
ity on the part of one objectively responsible for an injury constitutes
an obstacle to the imputation of a "fault," to the recognition of afait
gindrateur de responsabilitd,2 or so as to reduce a victim's right to
damages. In particular, there has been an increasing imposition of
liability among infants and mentally handicapped persons. Indeed,
the evolution of French law reflects a measured societal response to a
perceived need for security. As judicial and governmental institutions
have attempted to provide for more automatic methods of indemnity,
the burdens of expanded liability have been tempered by mandatory
insurance laws. These developments have pinched the legal system
between two logics, which if not mutually exclusive, are at least very
different: one of liability, and one of insurance. The result is what has
* B.A., 1977, Samford University; J.D., 1980, Cumberland School of Law; L.L.M.,
Bus. & Tax., 1982, McGeorge School of Law; Doctoral Candidate, Droit Civil Privi, Strasberg
University, France.
1. 1 M. DE JUGLART, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL, vol. 2, 225, para. 524 (1978).
2. A fait gdndrateur de responsabiliti is an act which will result in the attachment of
liability, but which does not necessarily require "fault" on the part of the actor. Such a trig-
gering act is not limited to a civil wrong. It may also be found in the commission of a delict,
one of the three categories of penal responsiblity. See generally Catala & Weir, Delict and
Tort& A Study in Parallel, 37 TUL. L. REV. 573, 593-606 (1962-1963). Thus the links which
exist between civil and criminal law create the possibility for civil remedies to be awarded to a
victim of a criminal violation. Two of the decisions of the Assembl6e Pl6nire on May 9, 1984,
addressed just such a cross-over situation. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
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come to be known in the French legal community as the "liability
crisis."' 3 The philosophical changes which have occurred in this area
of continuing friction are reflected in five recent decisions rendered by
the Assembl6e P16ni~re4 of the Court of Cassation.5 In May of 1984,
the mixed assembly of France's highest court took the opportunity to
reexamine the nature of a small child's liability. Those decisions ad-
dressed the issues of whether a child should be held responsible for
injuries he or she inflicts upon another, and whether a child's contrib-
utory "fault" should be recognized in the absence of proof as to his or
her capacity to comprehend the dangerous nature of a particular act.6
Although many questions remain unanswered, these five decisions are
significant, as they are the first by the nation's highest court to so
clearly accept the premise that liability grounded on a theory of fault
may attach to persons who are simply unable to understand the con-
sequences of their acts.
The dramatic evolution in the area of a child's liability is attribu-
table, at least in part, to the liability which has recently been imposed
on another category of persons: those with diminished mental capaci-
3. Viney, La Faute de la Victime d'un Accident Corporel le Prdsent et l'Avenir, 1984
Juris-Classeur P6riodique [J.C.P.] I No. 3155. Grafted onto the traditional notions of liability,
unified since 1804, are new concepts of insurance and risk allocation. Although these con-
cepts have been helpful in the area of damage reparation, their increasing use has served to
distort the law's ability to regulate individual conduct. In order to favor the application of a
contract of insurance so that victims would not go without recovery, courts found it necessary
to enlarge notions of liability to such an exent that the law is in no way fulfilling the role
envisaged by the drafters of the code. Id. at para. 25.
4. The Assemble Pl6ni~re is a formation of the Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court
for nonadministrative matters in France, which is composed of representatives from the five
civil chambers and one criminal chamber of the Court. Its jurisdiction is mandatory in those
instances when a second appeal to the Court of Cassation is based on the same grounds as one
previously entertained by the Court. R. GUILLEN & J. VINCENT, LEXIQUE DE TERMES
JURIDIQUES 34 (5th ed. 1981), The Jand'heur decision is an example of just such a situation.
Cf infra text accompanying note 49. It is discretionary, facultative, when there are divergent
solutions to similar problems being proposed by the various courts of first and second instance,
or between those courts and the Court of Cassation. R. GUILLEN & J. VINCENT, LEXIQUE DE
TERMES JURIDIQUES 35-36 (5th ed. 1981).
5. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. plbn., Fr., 1984 Recueil Dalloz-Sirez, Jurispru-
dence [D.S. Jur.] 528; Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pln., Fr., id. at 529; Judgment of
May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. plan., Fr., id.; Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. plan., Fr., id.;
Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. plan., Fr., id. at 529-30.
6. Because the existence of a discerning will was perceived to be a condition precedent
to the attachment of liability, very young children have, from time immemorial, been consid-
ered as incapable of committing a fault. From the inauguration of the Civil Code in 1804 until
1984, this "no liability" principle was supported by jurisprudence constante at all court levels.
Cf 1984 D.S. Jur. 525. For a general discussion of the distinction betwen stare decisis and
jurisprudence constante, see infra note 64.
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ties.7 Prior to 1968, it was well-settled law that such persons were
incapable of committing a fault which would result in the attachment
of liability under the Civil Code.8 The question which was posed just
after that legislative reform is reiterated in these five 1984 decisions:
is French jurisprudence developing a new principle of liability which
might be applied in other situations where the incapacity of the actor
has traditionally precluded a finding of liability based on fault? Until
recently, the courts had strictly adhered to the letter of the 1968 legis-
lation-a text directed towards mentally handicapped adults.9 The
courts had not expanded their horizons to consider the applicability
of that statute to the actions of those who, by virtue of their tender
years, are incapable of formulating the necessary intent for the impu-
tation offaute. 10 The decisions of May, 1984 reflect a clear deviation
from that historical position. Subsequent legislation and jurispru-
dence echo the dramatic philosophical changes announced by those
five decisions. In fact, the promulgation of the law of 5 July 1985,
relative to the indemnification of victims of automobile accidents'I
has surpassed all previous efforts to assign liability in the absence of
recognized fault.
It will be the purpose of this article to examine the evolving no-
tions of French liability, which are grounded in theories of risk social-
ization rather than classical notions of fault, as these notions relate to
persons who have, due to their lack of discerning capacity, been con-
sidered beyond the pale of traditional tort liability. A review of recent
legislation and jurisprudence will culminate with an examination of
the new law of vehicular accidents which went into effect in July of
1985.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Generally speaking, there are not more than a half-dozen provi-
sions of the French Civil Code which are typically invoked when a
victim seeks reparation for injuries which have been inflicted by an-
7. Law of Jan. 3, 1968, No. 68-5, CODE CIVILE [C. civ.] art. 489-2 (Fr.); 1968 J.C.P. III
No. 33756.
8. Barbieri, Inconscience et Responsabilitd dans le Jurisprudence Civile: l'Incidence de
l'Article 489-2 Aprs un Ddcennie, 1982 J.C.P. I No. 3057. Article 1382 is the major provision
in the French Civil Code which predicates liability on subjective fault. See infra text accompa-
nying note 17.
9. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
10. 1978 J.C.P. II No. 18793.
11. Bihr, La Grande Illusion (A Propos du Projet de Loi en Matire d'Accidents de la
Circulation), 1985 Recueil Dalloz-Sirez, Chronique [D.S. Chron.] 63.
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other. For the purposes of this article, the discussion will be limited
to the most often applied code provisions. Article 1382 is the "cidssi-
cal fault" provision of the Code which has historically required a
showing of subjective fault on the part of the defendant. 12 Article
1382 section 1 is the clause most often employed when the injury is
caused by an instrumentality under the control of a person. 13 Article
1384 section 4 invokes liability on the part of parents when an injury
is caused by their minor child.' , Finally, new article 489-2 imposes
liability on mentally-handicapped adults for injuries or damage which
they have caused.15 The four provisions are interrelated, in that each
addresses various aspects of the question of injury. Due to their simi-
larities, adjustments in the philosophical underpinnings of any partic-
ular provision, as precipitated by doctrine or the jurisprudence of the
Court of Cassation, exert significant influence on the development of
neighboring articles. An examination of each provision, together with
the jurisprudential milestones which have affected its application
under the evolving theory of risk socialization, will serve to demon-
strate the extent to which French society has evolved in its notions of
reparable injury.
A. Article 1382 - The Citadel Of Traditional Fault
The cornerstone of French delictual liability is article 1382.16 It
has traditionally been the provision most often invoked by a claimant
when seeking to recover damages for injury caused either negligently
or intentionally by another. That section is brief and states in broad
yet unconditional terms that: "[a]ny act whatever of man which
causes damages to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to
make reparation."'
17
The principle established in article 1382 is not new. The laws of
12. C. civ. art. 1382 (Fr.).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. C. Civ. art. 489-2 (Fr.). Article 489-2 of the Civil Code is located in the first chapter
of the Eleventh Title, which addresses "majority, and those adults who are protected by the
law." Id.
16. See Catala & Weir, supra note 2, at 577, 602-06.
17. J. DOMAT, CIVIL LAW vol. I, bk. 2, tit. 8 § 4 (1850). This language is identical to
that of the Code Napol6on of 1804. Domat, in his analysis of that article, said that all losses,
all damages which may come from the act of a person, whether from imprudence, levity,
ignorance of what he is bound to know, or other like faults, however trivial they may be, ought
to be repaired by him whose imprudence or other fault has caused them. It is a tort that he has
committed, though he may have had no intention to injure. Id.
[Vol. 9:545548
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Rome had recognized this natural law notion 18 long before the crea-
tion of the Code Napol6on. 19 The courts have historically held that
the crucial element in a cause of action based on article 1382 is the
establishment of fault. 20 The dictionary defines civil fault as, "the at-
titude of a person, who due either to his negligence, imprudence or
malice fails to respect his contractual engagements, or his duty to
avoid causing injury to others." Historically, this fault required in-
vestigation by the finder of fact of the "soul and state of mind of the
agent." 2
1
It is clear that a fault is an error of conduct. 22 Yet in today's
rapidly changing world, what standard should be employed to deter-
mine whether the author of an injury has committed such an error?
Professor Mazeaud has opined that because civil liability is not puni-
tive in nature, civil fault should be measured in abstracto, that is,
based on an objective standard.2 3 According to the objective ap-
proach, when weighing a person's actions on the scales of liability, it
should not matter that a person believed that he or she was perform-
ing in a proper way, if other persons in the same circumstances would
have performed the act differently. 24  Appreciation of conduct
through the use of an objective standard requires that the author of an
injury be compared to an abstract model. The quiddam in French law
is the bon pere de famille, of article 1137 of the Civil Code, a
francophyle descendant of the bonus paterfamilias of the Roman
18. Domat and Pothier, two jurists of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries whose
philosophies exerted profound influence on the drafters of Napol6on's Code, both unequivo-
cally recognized that liability in delict is grounded on fault. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY,
THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 593 (2d ed. 1977).
19. This natural law notion was also known as the Aquilian standard of fault. "Among
the civil wrongs known to Roman law was one provided for in the Lex Aquilia, which was
concerned in very general terms with the harm unlawfully caused to another." Catala & Weir,
supra note 2, at 583. As the definition of "harm" in that statute was broadly written, it became
usual for it to be applied in those situations where remedies were not discoverable within the
narrower, nominate categories of wrongs. "In the end, this action came to absorb all [of the
other] categories of liability. Thus was [begun the notion] that any fault which resulted in
damage to another imposed an obligation on the party at fault to repair the damage." Id.
20. Judgment of July 19, 1870, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1870 Recueil Dalloz, Periodique et
Critique [D.P.] I 361; "The existence of a legally imputable fault is one of the essential condi-
tions of an action for damages under article 1383." Id., note Labb6; 1871 Recueil Sirez, Juris-
prudence [S. Jur.] I 9.
21. Mazeaud, La "Faute Objective" et la Responsabilitd Sans Faute, 1985 D.S. Chron. 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also G. VINEY, LES OBLIGATIONS, LA RESPONSABILITI: CONDITIONS, in IV
TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 555 (J. Ghestin ed. 1982).
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law. 25 The objective man is no superman, merely a "man of foresight
and direction" very much like his Anglo-American counterpart, the
reasonable man.26
Because article 1382, the bastion of liability for personal acts, is
firmly grounded on an appreciation of subjective fault,27 develop-
ments in both the prediction of liability on notions other than subjec-
tive fault, and in the apportionment of damages based on the
comparative fault of the parties have come about only lately, and only
after substantial theoretical foundations had been established through
the recently constructed provision of article 1384 section 1.
B. Fait Ginirateur de Reponsabiliti - Article 1384 section 1
1. Historical application and jurisprudential discovery
According to French law, "[a] person is responsible not only for
the damage which he causes by his own acts, but also for that which is
caused by the act of persons for whom he is responsible or for things
which he has in his keeping."' 28 Though drafted in potentially sweep-
ing language, it is clear that the editors of the Civil Code of 1804 had
only two situations in mind which would be susceptible to the applica-
tion of this provision: the liability of a person for the damages caused
by his animal, and of a proprietor for injuries caused by his improp-
erly-maintained building.29 The text thus passed largely unused
through nearly all of the nineteenth century. 30 But with the increase
25. H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAITif THtORETIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE, DfLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE § 428, at 498 (1965).
26. Catala & Weir, supra note 2, at 608-09 n. 145.
27. Id. at 602.
28. C. civ. art. 1384 § 1 (Fr.).
29. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 749.
30. Prior to this development, a victim with recourse only to article 1382 would be re-
quired to meet the often unsustainable burden of proving either the faute of the proprietor, or
of the custodian of the instrumentality. By the end of the century, however, the soundness of
the "fault principle" in every situation was being attacked by many of the most important
French jurists. For example, in 1897 Professor Josserand commented:
For three quarters of a century we contented ourselves with this conception [of fault]
which, because of its requirements, did not always assure to the victim compensation
for the harm he suffered. The deficiencies and injustice of this conception were only
made clear by the progress of industry and of human activity. Machines took the
place of man and horse, production and movement continually increased in an unex-
pected degree, the number of accidents not only increased, but, and this is more
important, changed their character. Accidents came to have very often an obscure
origin, an uncertain cause that made it hard to place responsibility. As the accident
became industrial and mechanical, it also became anonymous.
L. JOSSERAND, DE LA RESPONSABILITi DU FAIT DES CHOSES INANIMtES 6-8 (1897), re-
printed in A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 18, at 600.
[Vol. 9:545
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in injuries caused by inanimate objects during the industrial revolu-
tion, the provision found new and expansive application. Thus, it was
in the realm of accidents anonymes, those situations where the cause
of an injury is unknown, and fault is difficult to prove, that the provi-
sion was most utilized. The majority of victims of accidents anonymes
were workers and employees, and courts recognized the importance of
satisfying those claimants who were disarmed in the face of huge and
well-organized enterprises.31 Article 1384 section 1 was successfully
relied upon for the first time in such a situation in 1896, when certain
workers were injured by the explosion of a boiler on a barge. 32 In that
landmark decision, the Court of Cassation ruled that there is inherent
in the first paragraph of article 1384 a presumption of liability for
injuries caused by instrumentalities, and that such liability is distinct
from that envisioned in article 1382. 33
Professor Saleilles, commenting on the Teffaine case, presaged its
landmark potential, and highlighted the decision's introduction of a
new approach to the notion of reparable harm, when he opined: "It
may well be that the whole theory of industrial risk has entered
through this decision into our case law."
' 34
It should be noted that the French notion of prisumption de
faute carries a greater effect than its cognate in Anglo-American juris-
prudence. It is not a presumption of fault in the true sense of those
words, because the presumption will not be overcome by the mere
showing of an absence of fault. According to the language of the
court, the presumption of fault can only be rebutted by demonstrating
force majeure,35 casfortuit36 or a causation which is not attributable
31. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 18, at 600.
32. Judgment of June 16, 1896, Cass. civ. soc., Fr., 1897 S. Jur. 1 17, note Esmein; G.
VINEY, supra note 24, at 749.
33. Prior to that time the Court of Cassation had consistently ruled that a person seeking
redress under article 1382 for injuries suffered when a boiler exploded must demonstrate, in
addition to the accident itself, that the owner had committed a fault which led to the injury.
Judgment of July 19, 1870, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1871 S. Jur. I 9, note Labbi; 1870 D.P. I 361.
34. R. SALEILLES, LEs ACCIDENTS DU TRAVAIL, ET LA REsPONSABILITit CIVILE; ESSAI
D'UNE THtORIE DE LA RESPONSABILITf DELICTUELLE 1 (1897), reprinted in A. VON MEH-
REN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 18, at 610.
35. Force majeure has been defined as an event which is unforeseeable and insurmount-
able, which prevents a debtor from carrying out his or her obligation, and serves to exonerate
that person from such duty. It supposes an event which is completely outside the control of
the person who asserts it as a defense, whether it be a force of nature, of government, or of a
third person. R. GUILLEN & J. VINCENT, supra note 4, at 206.
36. Often used synonymously with force majeure, casfortuit actually refers to the impos-
sibility of fulfilling an obligation due to internal causes, such as faulty instruments or material.
Id. at 63. In fact, certain French courts have gone so far as to declare that the two terms are
1987]
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to the party which is presumed liable.37 The judicial re-interpretation
of article 1384 section 1 expressly recognizing a presumption of fault
soon opened the door to legislative reforms which addressed the issue
of adequate worker's compensation. 38 In the years which followed,
article 1384 section 1 was also employed to compensate for injuries
caused to third parties by fires which began at industrial sites. In the
initial decision on point, the article was invoked when some kegs con-
taining flammable substances in an industrial warehouse ignited and
destroyed several buildings in the surrounding area. 39 The legislative
response to the insurance lobby was swift, however, and succeeded in
precluding aggrieved victims from subsequently relying on that article
for redress. That legislation provided that when the injury was
caused by a fire, an additional burden of proof would have to be sus-
tained; that of demonstrating faute on the part of the person objec-
tively responsible. 4°
2. The Jand'heur decision
The most significant and long-reaching development in the appli-
cation of article 1384 section 1 came as a result of the rapid expansion
of the automobile industry in France after the First World War.41 In
identical. Judgment of Apr. 10, 1925, Tribunal Civil de Lectoure, Fr., 1925 D.P. 105, 1925
Dalloz, Hebdomadaire [D.H.] 400; 1925 Recueil Gazette du Palais [G.P.] 11 113.
37. Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe,
79 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1931).
38. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 750 (discussing Law of Apr. 9, 1898).
39. Judgment of Nov. 16, 1920, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1920 D.P. I. 169, note Savatier; 1922
S. Jur. I 97, note Huguency.
40. The law of Nov. 7, 1922, caused the insertion of two additional paragraphs into arti-
cle 1384, immediately following 1384 § 1. The two paragraphs prescribed that
However, a person who is in possession, regardless of the legal basis thereof, of
immovable or movable property in which a fire has originated, shall not be liable
toward third parties unless it is proved that the fire was due to his fault or to the fault
of persons for whom he is responsible.
This provision does not apply to the landlord and tenant relation, which remains
governed by articles 1733 and 1734 of the civil code.
The English translation of article 1384 is found at A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra
note 18, at 621.
That law was clearly reactionary. It was passed under the pressure of insurance compa-
nies frightened by the financial consequences of recent court decisions. As with nearly all such
laws of exigency, it was found to be insusceptible of facile application. It created in effect an
island of liability, with poorly defined parameters. As it applied strict liability to the custodian
of a thing without providing a legal foundation, it was narrowly interpreted by the courts. G.
VINEY, supra note 24, at 646.
41. For an in-depth study of the development of that clause to provide for those persons
who were victims of automobile accidents during those early years, see Deak, supra note 37, at
271.
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the early post-war years, liability for injuries caused by automobiles
was established solely according to the mandates of article 1382. A
victim thus carried the burden of establishing the fault of the driver.
The notion of applying the first paragraph of article 1384 to the prob-
lem found no judicial acceptance in those instance where a person was
operating the vehicle at the time the injury occurred. Because the
instrumentality was "under the control of the hand of man," the acci-
dent was not "anonymous," and article 1384 was therefore inapplica-
ble. Inequities inherent in such construction led to virulent doctrinal
criticism which was not unheeded by the courts.
Perhaps the most significant jurisprudential (rather than legisla-
tive) application of article 1384 section 1 during those early years
came in 1930, when Lise Jand'heur was run over by a delivery truck
owned by a local department store, Galeries Belfortaises.42 When
Mrs. Jand'heur brought an action for her daughter's injuries under
article 1384 section 1, 43 the lower court found in its factual investiga-
tion that the vehicle which hit Lise was under the direct control of its
driver at the time of the accident. Article 1384 section 1 was thus
held inapplicable on the grounds that the accident was not "anony-
mous" within the traditional meaning of the word. The court ruled
that in order for Lise's parents to recover, they would have to bring
their action under article 1382, and demonstrate either fault on the
part of the driver or a hidden defect (vice cache) in the truck which
caused the injury.44 On appeal, however, the Court of Cassation re-
versed the lower court, and held that there is inherent in article 1384
section 1 a presumption of fault which weighs upon the person re-
sponsible for the instrumentality causing the injury. 45 Further, since
article 1384 section 1 makes no distinction between injuries caused by
autonomous machines, and those under a person's control, the
Supreme Court held that the presumption of liability will attach by
virtue of the existence of the instrumentality itself, rather than due to
the actions of the person "in control" at the time of the injury.46 Be-
cause of this presumption, the guardian of an instrumentality would
be unable to avoid liability merely by demonstrating his or her own
due care. The Court ruled that the presumption of liability in article
42. Judgment of Feb. 14, 1930, Cass. ch. r6un., Fr., 1930 D.P. I 57.
43. Id. at 57-58, rapport Le Marc Ladour, concl. M. le Proc. g6n. Matter, note Ripert;
1930 S. Jur. 1 121, note Esmein.
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1384 section 1 will withstand all defenses, with the exception of cas
fortuit, and force majeure.4 7 Although the Jand'heur decision engen-
dered lively debate, its well-chosen language48 and rationale resulted
in a long-term philosophical acceptance of a presumption of fault
under article 1384 section 1. Thus, a foundation was laid for further
development of risk socialization under French law. Because the pro-
vision linked liability directly to a person's control over an instrumen-
tality, or to the instrumentality itself (rather than to traditional
notions of fault), victims would never again be faced with the un-
happy burden of proving the inherent dangerousness of an instrumen-
tality (vice cache) or activity, or the actual fault of the operator of the
device.49
In subsequent doctrinal treatment, the Court of Cassation was
subjected to bitter criticism from traditional subjective fault philoso-
phers.50 Often responsive to doctrinal censure, the court periodically
retrenched from the Jand'heur decisions. In one such case the court
addressed the question of the "normal condition" of an instrumental-
ity which is subject to a person's use or control under article 1384
section 1. In the Cad decision,5' the plaintiff slipped while leaving a
bath in a public bath house, and fell onto a central heating pipe. His
suit for damages alleged that the proprietor of the bath house was the
guardian of the heating system which was responsible for the injury.
The court rejected the claim, however, finding that the pipes were in
normal condition. Partisans of subjective liability say this decision
recognizes that a guardian would not be held liable if the instrument
which caused the injury had been maintained in a normal manner.' 2
Soon thereafter, in the now-celebrated Franck decision,53 the court
addressed the interesting problem of liability of an automobile owner
47. Id.
48. The court carefully chose the language which would be formalized in the decision,
employing "presumption of liability" rather than such terms as "presumption of fault," or
"obligation to indemnify." Id., rapport Le Marc Ladour, concl. M. le Proc. grn. Matter, note
Ripert; 1930 S. Jur. 1 121, note Esmein.
49. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1930, Cass. ch. rrun., Fr., 1930 D.P. I 57; 1930 S. Jur. 1 121,
note Esmein.
50. 1 M. DE JUGLART, supra note I, at 263.
51. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1937, Cour d'appel de Colmar, Fr. (unpublished), reprinted in I
M. DE JUGLART, supra note 1, at 276-77.
52. Id. Liability would have attached, however, had the proprietor left the instrumental-
ity in an abnormal or defective condition.
53. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1941, Cass. ch. rrun., Fr., 1942 Recueil Dalloz, Critique Juris-
prudence [D.C. Jur.] 25, note Ripert; 1941 S. Jur. I 217, note Mazeaud; 1942 J.C.P. II No.
1766, note Mihura.
[Vol. 9:545554
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for injuries caused by his automobile, after it had been stolen. The
court held in that case that liability of an owner will not survive the
theft of a vehicle; liability will pass to that person exerting "direction,
use and control" over the instrumentality. 54 The Franck decision was
a signal victory for the disciples of fault.
55
Although jurisprudential development of the clause was stifled in
its early years by more powerful economic interests,5 6 the philosophy
which was at the foundation of its development succeeded through
legislation to provide indemnity for victims of airline, 57 cable car,58
and boat accidents. 59 Article 1384 section 1 also provided the philo-
sophical underpinnings for the "Tunc Project" 60 which grew to frui-
tion in the form of the law of 5 July 1985.61 That law provides
practically automatic indemnity to persons injured in automobile ac-
cidents, without requiring the establishment of fault on the part of the
driver of the automobile.
62
3. Fault, the establishment of liability, and the apportionment of
damages: the jurisprudence of Desmares
It was widely believed that the Jand'heur decision effectively cre-
ated an objective test for the application of liability, thereby negating
the necessity of research into questions of fault in those situations
where the injury was caused by an instrumentality. Further, the pre-
sumption of liability in Jand'heur was considered to be irrebuttable,
absent a showing of force majeure. The harsh results of such an un-
bending rule caused courts and jurists to seek a humane resolution of
two diametrically opposed philosophies. The force majeure rule in
Jand'heur protected a victim in a "faultless injury" even when that
victim's actions were not completely above legal reproach. Yet nor-
mally, a finding of fault, whether in its original or contributory form,
54. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1941, Cass. ch. r6un., Fr., 1942 D.C. Jur. 25, note Ripert; 1941
S. Jur. I 217, note Mazeaud.
55. 1 M. DE JUGLART, supra note 1, at 263-64, para. 556.
56. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 776 (Law of Nov. 7, 1922); Larroumet, Responsabilitd du
Fait des Choses Inanimie, in IV RfPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 58 para. 627 (P. Raynard ed.
1975).
57. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 750 (discussing Law of May 3, 1924).
58. Id. (discussing Law of July 8, 1941).
59. Id. (discussing Law of Jan. 3, 1967).
60. A. TUNC, POUR UN LOI SUR LES ACCIDENTS DE LA CIRCULATION 8 (1981); Durry,
Responsabiliti Civile, 81 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.]
604, 607 (July-Sept. 1982); A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 18, at 638-39.
61. Law of July 5, 1985, No. 85-667, C. civ. art. 3 (Fr.).
62. Id.
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would require a finding of liability upon its author. The fact that the
negligent person might have also been the victim in no way reduced
his or her contributory fault. In such a situation, how were the courts
to avoid leaving at least part of the bill for an injury at the negligent
victim's feet? The legal dilemma caused by the tension between these
notions of subjective and objective fault also affected the development
of article 1384 section 1 in the post-Jand'heur years. Among the is-
sues the court had to address was whether a person in control of an
instrumentality which causes an injury should be at least partially ex-
onerated from liability, even though the contributory fault of the vic-
tim was not so grave as to be characterized as "unforeseeable and
unavoidable" according to the theory of force majeure.
In 1982 the Court of Cassation addressed that issue in the now
famous Desmares63 decision. That case grew out of injuries caused
when Mr. Desmares ran over a pedestrian couple as they were cross-
ing the street. The plaintiffs brought an action under article 1384 sec-
tion 1 for injuries caused by the automobile which was at the time
subject to his use and control. Mr. Desmares asserted that the plain-
tiffs were themselves contributorily negligent for the injuries they in-
curred. In the first instance, the judges found that the plaintiffs were
negligent in that they had not only failed to use the cross walk, but
also they had crossed the street without watching for traffic. The
Desmares court recognized that according to the jurisprudence con-
stante 64 of the Jand'heur decision and article 1384 section 1, only neg-
63. Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1982 D.S. Jur. 449, rapport Charbon-
nier; 1982 J.C.P. II No. 19861, note Larroumet; 1982 J.C.P. II No. 18961, note Chabas; Durry,
supra note 60, at 606-07. For additional comment on the issues addressed in the Desmares
decision, see R. SAVATIER, LES SOURCES DE LA RESPONSABILITI CIVILE, bk. I TRAITt DE
LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN AISE 493-500 (2d ed. 1951); H. MAZEAUD, L.
MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD & F. CHABAS, in 1 LECONS DE DROrr CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS
655-76 (1986); A. WEILL & F. TERRN, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 752 (4th ed. 1986); P.
LE TOURNEAU, LA RESPONSABLITt CIVILE 254 (3d ed. 1982); Chabas, Fait ou Faute de la
Victime? 1973 D. Chron. XXIX 40; Lambert-Faire, Aspects Juridiques, Moraux et Economi-
ques de l'Indemnisation des Victimes Fautives, 1982 D. Chron. 207.
64. While stare decisis cannot be considered as an applicable doctrine in civil jurisdic-
tions, there is a similar doctrine which is recognized and called jurisprudence constante.
There are three major distinctions between the doctrines, however. First, a single decision
creates a sufficient foundation for stare decisis, while a series of adjudicated cases all on point
and all in accord is the requisite predicate for the recognition of jurisprudence constante. Sec-
ond, case law in civil jurisdictions is merely law de facto, while under common law, it is the
law dejure as well. Finally, under common law, stare decisis is a requirement, while in civil
theory, when a court is truly convinced of prior judicial error, a court may derogate from the
application of the legislative intent. Comment, Stare Decisis in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 100,
103 (1932-1933); see also Daggett, Dainow, Hibert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A
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ligence which can be characterized as force majeure will exonerate the
guardian of an instrumentality from liability for the damage which it
causes.65 After investigating the facts, those judges held that the two
acts of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs did in fact
create a situation which was unforeseeable, unavoidable, and beyond
the control of the driver defendant, thereby meeting the test for the
defendant's application of force majeure.66 The court of appeals re-
versed the holding, however, finding the driver fully liable.67 That
court, after re-examining the facts, found that four lanes of traffic
were available to the driver of the automobile, and that the victims'
conduct did not amount to force majeure so as to break the chain of
causation. 68 The Desmares decision merely strengthened the position
that when an action is brought under article 1384 section 1, the fault
of a victim will exonerate a driver from complete liability in the ab-
sence of force majeure.69 In affirming the decision of the court of ap-
peals, the Court of Cassation recognized that the law imposed no duty
in such a situation for judges to address the issue of partial exonera-
tion of the automobile's driver due to the pedestrian's negligence. 70
In subsequent months the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of
Cassation frequently reaffirmed the essentials of the Desmares deci-
sion, although with some refinements. 71 According to the jurispru-
dence of that chamber, the holding in Desmares was not limited to
automobile accidents but was applicable to tout dommage provoquJ
par le fait d'une chose - the entire realm of article 1384 section 1.72
Thus, the refusal of a court to apportion liability based on the negli-
gence of a victim was not only inapplicable to motorists and cyclists,
but the statute also did not apply to passengers, conductors and by-
standers of many kinds. Finally, those persons found liable under this
Brieffor the Civil Law ofLouisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 17 (1937); Tate, Civilian Methodology
in Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REV. 673, 678 (1970).
65. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1930, Cass. ch. r~un., Fr., 1930 D.P. I 57, note Esmein; 1930 S.
Jur. 1 121.
66. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1930, Cass. ch. r6un., Fr., 1930 D.P. I 57.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Viney, supra note 3, at No. 3155, para. 12.
70. Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1982 D.S. Jur. II 449, rapport Charbon-
nier, note Larroumet; 1982 J.C.P. II No. 19861, note Chabas; Durry, supra note 60, at 606-07.
71. Judgment of Oct. 14, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1982 G.P. II 597; Judgment of Oct. 27,
1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 J.C.P. II 20162, note Chabas; Judgment of Jan. 25, 1984, Cass.
civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 J.C.P. IV 113; Judgment of Feb. 1, 1984, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 J.C.P. IV
113.
72. Judgment of Mar. 10, 1983, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 76 Bull. Civ. II 51.
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provision would be responsible not only for the inanimate objects
under their control, but also for their animals. 73 The Second Cham-
ber however, carefully avoided touching on the issue of liability for
personal acts (responsabilitd du fait personnel, article 1382). That
court continued to recognize that a defendant might be partially exon-
erated from liability in the face of a victim's fault, when the action
was brought under article 1382. 74 When an action was couched in
articles 1382 and 1384 section 1 concurrently, the court held that a
refusal to apportion liability must prevail. 75 The court also adopted
an anti-expansionist position in the face of efforts to soften the defini-
tions of imprdvisible and irrdsistable, as portions of the defense known
as force majeure.
76
With regard to other formations in the high court, neither the
First nor the Third Civil Chambers seemed to take a definitive stance
on the subject of partial exoneration of a guardian responsible under
1384 section 1, due to the contributory fault of the victim. On two
occasions, however, the Criminal Chamber of the high court, when
faced with a finding of a victim's slight negligence (ligre inattention),
struck down lower court rulings which had admitted the apportion-
ment of liability.77 Although the interpretation of these cases is some-
what delicate, it is possible to see some sympathy on the part of the
Criminal Chamber with the Second Civil Chamber's Desmares
decision.
78
Until May of 1984, the courts of appeal were fairly well in accord
with the Desmares decision. The courts of the first instance, however,
were strongly divided. 79 This division, together with the doctrinal
tempest which it engendered,80 caused the president of the Court of
Cassation to raise the issue of partial exoneration of a defendant due
to a victim's contributory negligence. On May 9, 1984, the president
of the court submitted to the Assembl6e Pl6nibre five cases for review,
73. Judgment of Jan. 18, 1984, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 J.C.P. IV 96.
74. 1982 G.P. Somm. 317, note Chabas.
75. Judgment of Dec. 8, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 J.C.P. IV 69.
76. In several decisions the high court censured lower courts' efforts to enlarge the char-
acteristics of "unforeseeable" and "irresistable," as they were applied to the fault of the victim.
Viney, supra note 3, at No. 3155.
77. Judgment of Jan. 25, 1983, Cass. crim., Fr., 1983 J.C.P. IV 113.
78. Judgment of June 14, 1983, Cass. crim., Fr., 1983 J.C.P. IV 269.
79. Judgments of Dec. 9 & 15, 1982, Cours d'appel de Paris, 1982 D.S. Jur. 153, note
Larroumet; Judgment of Jan. 5, 1983, Cours d'appel de Paris, 1983 D.S. Jur. 183, 184, note
Larroumet.
80. Viney, supra note 3, at No. 3155, para. 7-8.
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each of which in some way addressed that issue and which required a
uniform judicial touch.81
In the first of those decisions,82 Eric Gabillet, a three-year old
child, fell from a wooden plank suspended between two objects, and
injured his friend Phillipe Noye with the stick which he held in his
hand. Phillipe's parents, acting as legal administrators for their son,
brought an action against Eric's parents, alleging that they had failed
in the exercise of their duty to oversee their child (droit de garde), and
that the injury to their son was the proximate result. Their action was
couched in article 1384.83 The court of first instance found Eric him-
self liable for injuries caused by an instrumentality under his control,
on a foundation of liability established in article 1384. The presump-
tion of liability found in 138484 resulted in the attachment of liability
to Eric's parents. On appeal they argued that the imputation of liabil-
ity presupposes the capacity to discern the consequences of one's ac-
tions, and that article 1384 was improperly applied to the actions of
their son. In May of 1984, the Court of Cassation rejected that argu-
ment, and found that liability had properly been assigned to the child,
even though the lower court failed to make specific findings as to the
child's capacity of discernment. Fault sufficient to impose liability on
a child under article 1384, with rebounding liability on his parents,
was thus found in the absence of a specific finding as to discernment.85
In the second decision of May 9, 1984,86 a child of seven fired an
arrow which struck his friend. An action was brought by the parents
of the injured child against the parents of the actor, again under arti-
cle 1384. The Court of Cassation, having found liability on the part
of the child based upon article 1384, had no difficulty translating that
liability to the parents. While there was no specific finding as to
"fault" of the child, in the traditional meaning of that term, the court
did recognize that an act which was "objectively wrong" (objective-
mentfautive)87 would suffice to entrain the father's liability under ar-
ticle 1384 section 4.
Neither of these decisions should be interpreted to mean that lia-
bility of children of tender years is now definitively established. This
81. Id.
82. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. plan., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 529.
83. For details as to the role of article 1384 § 4, see infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
84. See infra text accompanying note 94.
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continues to be an area of disparate application. 88 The decisions are
both significant, however, for the developing legal norms which they
reflect. Although the Gabillet and Fullenwarth decisions only ad-
dressed the narrow issue of a child as the guardian of an instrumental-
ity, they may be read as the "first fruits" of the long-planted seeds of
risk allocation for injuries caused by children. Indeed they represent
nothing less than a philosophical acceptance of a child's liability for
his or her personal acts.
4. The presumption of fault as applied to those with diminished
capacity: The Trichard decision and article 489-2
The issue of whether liability can be imposed on the author of an
injury in the absence of his or her capacity should first be examined
from the perspective of articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.
Prior to the legislative upheavals of 1968,89 the jurisprudential treat-
ment of this issue was clear: fault presupposed a discerning will, and
a person devoid of capacity, for whatever reason, could not be held
liable under those provisions. 90 From a practical standpoint, this ap-
proach caused great hardship to the penurious victim, especially when
the person objectively responsible was in possession of large sums of
money. French jurisprudence tempered that notion by finding fault in
the person or persons responsible for the surveillance of the author of
the damage (article 1384 section 4). If damages were inflicted
through the aid of an instrumentality, the courts could also employ
article 1384 section 1 to redress the injury. Indeed, courts largely rec-
ognized Jand'heur's "presumption of liability" as a societal accept-
ance of the theory of objective liability based not on fault, but rather
on risk.91
Initially, the Court of Cassation affirmed the presumption that
liability predicated on article 1384 section 1 required a finding of sub-
jective fault. Usage, power and direction have been recognized as the
essential characteristics of a guardianship over an instrumentality,
and those require a modicum of discernment. It was therefore justifi-
able to negate the presumption of discernment found in article 1384
section 1 with regard to an individual who lacks capacity at the mo-
88. Warembourg-Augue, Irresponsabiliti ou Responsabiliti Civile de L'.nfans, " 81
REV. TRIM. DR. Civ., 329 (Apr.-June 1982).
89. Law of Jan. 3, 1968, No. 68-5, C. civ. art. 489-2 (Fr.), 1968 J.C.P. III No. 33756.
90. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1901, Cass. Req., Fr., 1902 D.P. I 524, 525, rapport Letellier.
91. 1 M. DE JUGLART, supra note 1, at 262-63, para. 555.
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ment that he or she injures a victim. 92 There was a resistance to that
approach, however, both in doctrine and in jurisprudence.9 3 Beyond
the practical problems which have already been mentioned, the re-
quirement of an ability to discern is nowhere mentioned in the Code
as a characteristic of a guardian. The person with a reduced capacity
who drives an automobile has the usage, direction and control which
are enumerated in the provision as the essential elements of guardian-
ship of the instrumentality. That person has the power of control
over that instrumentality, and it is statutorily of little import that he
or she fails to understand the consequences which might result from
certain acts.
94
In 1956, Mr. Trichard was involved in an automobile accident
while in the process of overtaking the plaintiff, Mr. Piccino, on the
highway. The plaintiff brought both civil and penal actions against
Mr. Trichard. 95 The defendant was found not guilty in the penal ac-
tion, due to the fact that at the moment the injury occurred, he was
having an epileptic fit. He was thus found to be mentally incapable of
harboring the requisite intent under the operative article of the penal
code. 96 In the civil action, however, it was held that the impairment
of Mr. Trichard's mental faculties was not an event which might be
characterized as a "cause dtrangire", that is, beyond the control of the
custodian of the instrumentality, so as to break the chain of causation
and relieve him from liability.97 The findings of the court in the penal
action thus had no bearing on the civil finding of liability under 1384
section 1. Although subsequent legislation has diminished the
Trichard decision of much persuasive authority,98 the case is still rele-
vant for its historical and theoretical significance. The Trichard court
accepted the proposition that the guardian of an instrumentality may
be found liable under article 1384 section 1 even though completely
unconscious of his or her acts.99 Such a recognition on the part of the
nation's highest court opened the door to claims against many other
persons who, for one reason or another, had been previously consid-
92. Judgment of Apr. 28, 1974, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1947 Recueil Dalloz, Jurisprudence
[D. Jur.] 329, 330, note Lalou; 1947 J.C.P. II No. 3601, 1947 G.P. I 279.
93. Judgment of Apr. 28, 1947, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1947 D. Jur. 329, 331, note Lalou.
94. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1965 G.P. I 202; 1965 D.S. Jur. 191,
concl. Schmelck; 1965 J.C.P. 11 14304, note Batie.
95. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1965 D.S. Jur. 191, 193, note Esmein.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 191, concL Schmelck.
98. 1984 D.S. Jur. 525, 527.
99. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1965 D.S. Jur. 191, 193 note Esmein.
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ered legally immune to actions due to their legally recognized inca-
pacities, such as children and the mentally handicapped.
Specifically rejecting prior jurisprudence on the foundations of
liability under article 1384 section 1, the Court of Cassation made two
enduring propositions in the Trichard decision. First, an epileptic
seizure which affects the driver of an automobile while in the course
of driving does not affect the nature of his or her guardianship. Sec-
ond, a guardian's loss of capacity is not a "foreign causation" (cause
&trangire) which will operate to exonerate him from liability.1°° The
rule in Trichard was followed in subsequent decisions of the highest
court. In a 1967 decision, the Court of Cassation held that deficien-
cies in intellectual capacity or "psychological disequilibrium" do not
constitute a sufficient foreign causation to exonerate a guardian from
liability.10 1 In addition, the court found that a person who has the
power over the direction, use and control of an instrumentality re-
mains its guardian, even when he or she is not in a position to prop-
erly exercise those powers.10 2 By failing to require that a guardian
discern the consequences of his actions, the new jurisprudence renders
moot those arguments which had been used to negate liability under
1384 section 1, in the absence of delictual fault.
10 3
A recent addition to the civil code, article 489-2 codifies Trichard
and its progeny, by providing that "he who has caused an injury to
another will be liable in damages therefore, even though at the time
under a mental incapacity."10 4 It was unclear at the time of its pas-
sage whether or not that provision was intended to speak solely to the
needs of victims of mentally-incapacitated adults, or whether it was
intended to exert theoretical influence on the rules applicable to liabil-
ity for personal acts, as codified in articles 1382 and 1383. Under the
first hypothesis, the impact of the new text on existing law would have
remained limited. Under the second, it would have affected a com-
plete reform in the notions of psychological imputability as an ele-
ment of civil fault. Ten years of jurisprudence and further
100. Id. at 191, concl. Schmelck. In truth, only this second proposition was clearly estab-
lished in the Court of Cassation. The first, only implicitly recognized in the actual decision,
was so well set out in written and oral arguments that subsequent doctrine considers that the
Court of Cassation adopted it, clearly breaking with prior jurisprudence. 62 REV. TRIM. DR.
Civ., 345, 351 (1965).
101. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1967, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1967 Bull. Civ. II No. 96; cf Durry,
Responsabilitd Civile, 65 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 828 (1967).
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
104. Law of Jan. 3, 1968, No. 68-5, C. civ. art. 489-2 (Fr.), 1968 J.C.P. III No. 33756.
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development in the theory of risk socialization clearly indicate that
the latter approach has controlled the question. 105 The significance of
article 489-2 lies in the power it exerts over the concepts of imputabil-
ity in all realms of injury.
Yet new article 489-2, for all of its theoretical impact on notions
of risk socialization, does not address many of the questions raised
when considering injury caused by a person lacking mental capacity.
Specifically, the provision only speaks to the liability of mentally-
handicapped adults. What of the imposition of liability on other
classes of persons, traditionally incapable of harboring the requisite
delictual intent? That legislation clearly fails to guide a judge consid-
ering the issue of a very young child's liability for personal acts, or for
injuries caused by an instrumentality within the child's control.106
Nor does article 489-2 lend itself to application in those situations
where the author of an injury happens to be a mentally-incapacitated
minor. As courts have been loath to expand application beyond the
parameters of the statute, mentally-handicapped children have so far
escaped liability by analogy.
It is clear that the legislative reform of 1968, due to the lacunae
in its sphere of application, has not voided the Trichard decision of
continuing philosophical interest and jurisprudential application. A
victim who makes a claim under article 489-2 must prove all of the
elements offaute, with the exception of imputability. In like manner,
that element has also been disposed of when the conditions for the
application of 1384 section 1 have been met. 10 7 Trichard is interesting
because it clearly distinguishes between liability founded on article
1382 and 1384 section 1. When an action is brought under article
1382, the plaintiff must prove that the injury was caused by the actual
fault of the defendant. Under article 1384 section 1, the plaintiff need
only prove that the injury was caused by an instrumentality which
105. Barbieri, supra note 8, at No. 3057, paras. 2-3.
106. Judgment of Nov. 23, 1972, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1973 J.C.P. IV No. 183391, note
Wibault. Several decisons have held that the child who has not reached the age of discernment
may not be held liable as a guardian. Durry, Responsabiliti Civile, 77 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.
652, 653 (1978).
107. J. CARBONNIER, LES OBLIGATIONS, in IV DROIT CIVIL 425-34 § 110 (1979). The
presumption of liability found in article 1384 § 1 attaches to the guardian of an instrumentality
which has caused an injury to another, even though no fault can be established on his or her
part, or if the cause of the injury is unknown. That presumption of liability will withstand all
refutation with the exception of force majeure, or of a foreign causation which is not imputable
to the guardian. Id. at 430; see also Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1965 D.S.
Chron. 191, 192, concl. Schmelck; 1965 G.P. I 202; 1965 J.C.P. II No. 14303, note Batie.
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was under the "guardianship" of the defendant.108 Proof of classical
fault is not necessary. The significance of article 489-2 is that it has
effectively created inroads on an action in liability for personal acts,
which has been traditionally predicated on article 1382. By substan-
tially weakening the element of imputability as applied to certain
types of defendants, it begins to mirror an action against the guardian
of an instrumentality under article 1384 section 1.
The causes of action which are derived from 1384 section 1 and
1382, although pursuing the same goal, proceed from distinct juridical
perspectives. Due to their unique points of departure, it has been held
that the failure of a cause of action under article 1382, even in the
form of a binding judgment, will not necessarily preclude a claim
based on article 1384 section 1.109 In its analysis of these distinct
causes of action, the Court of Cassation has ruled that if a plaintiff
brings an action ground in article 1382 only, the judge who fails to
find fault on the part of the defendant may not raise sui spondit a
cause of action based on article 1384 section 1.110 The legislature re-
jected such a formalistic approach when it drafted article 12 of the
New Code of Civil Procedure. Clauses three and four of that article
provide that the judge has the power to raise sui spondit those causes
of action (moyens de pur droit), thereby changing the grounds for re-
lief which were set out in the statement of claim, even though without
the expressed wishes of the parties.1 '
5. Fault and diminished capacity in recent case law
In three other decisions rendered on 9 May 1984,112 the Assem-
ble Pl'ni~re indicated that a judge may find contributory "fault" on
the part of infants who are accident victims, without first verifying
that those minors were capable of discerning the consequences of
their actions. Such findings, together with other recent developments
in risk socialization, lead ineluctably to the conclusion that a child
may be held liable for his or her acts under article 1382, in the ab-
108. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1964, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1965 D.S. Jur. 191.
109. Judgment of May 14, 1935, Cass. civ., Fr., 1946 J.C.P. II 3178, note Houin.
110. Id.
111. The Conseil d'Etat rendered paragraph three of article 12 a dead letter as it affects the
deliberations of the administrative courts. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1979, Conseil d'Etat, Fr.,
1979 D.S. Jur. 606, 607, note B6nabent; 1980 J.C.P. II No. 19288, concl. Franc, note Bor6;
1980 G.P. I 6, note Julien. Although that decision only affects claims in the administrative
tribunals, it does weaken substantially the philosophical underpinnings of that legislation.
112. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 528; Judgment of May
9, 1984, id.; Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., id. at 529-30.
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sence of a finding of discernment. These cases are significant in that
they represent the first successful assault upon the citadel of classical
notions of fault as set down in article 1382 of the Civil Code.11 3
In the first of these three decisions,1 4 a girl of five attempted to
cross a street in a cross walk, before watching for traffic. Upon seeing
a speeding car, she tried to return to the curb. Her efforts were too
late, and she was killed. In the penal courts the driver of the automo-
bile was found guilty of involuntary homicide. 115 As for civil penal-
ties, his insurance company obtained a reduction of damages, based
on the contributory negligence of the victim. When the parents filed a
claim against the insurance company, a legal journey of eight years
ensued. Finally, in May of 1984, the Assembl6e Pl6ni~re of the Court
of Cassation rejected their appeal, holding that the court of appeals
had properly apportioned damages, due to the contributory fault of
the child.1' 6 The court records in the first and second instances, how-
ever, fail to reflect that either tribunal investigated the deceased
child's capacity to understand her actions.
In the second case," 17 the Assembl6e P16ni~re addressed the legal
issues surrounding the death of a thirteen-year-old child who was
electrocuted while installing a lightbulb. The electrician, hailed
before the penal courts, was found guilty of involuntary homicide. In
the civil action, however, the defendant electrician sought partial ex-
oneration based on the negligence of the child for failing to cut the
current prior to commencing work. The judges in the first instance
granted the electrician's request for partial exoneration. The Court of
Cassation affirmed. "18 Again, there were no specific findings of fact as
to the deceased child's capacity of discernment in either of the pro-
ceedings in the first or second instance.
In the last decision,' 19 a nine-year-old child, together with his
parents, was found liable for the damages caused by the child's incin-
eration of a truck. The plaintiff's claim for relief was based upon
article 1382 of the civil code, and on article 435 of the penal code.
120
113. 1984 J.C.P. II 20921, rapport Fedou; Viney, supra note 3, at No. 3155, paras. 7-8;
1984 D.S. Jur. II 525, 526.
114. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 528.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 529-30.
118. Id,
119. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 528.
120. Law of Feb. 2, 1981, No. 81-82, C. civ. art. 435 (Fr.) provides:
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Although the court recognized the general principle that a minor is
not responsible for his or her penal infractions,' 2' the provision of the
penal code relied upon by the plaintiff supposed that the person objec-
tively responsible acted with understanding, or willfully (avec intelli-
gence ou volente). The Court of Cassation refused to re-examine the
findings of fact in the first instance; that the child's acts had been
"willful."'1 22 That level of awareness, sufficient to establish liability
under article 435 of the penal code, resulted in the attachment of arti-
cle 1382 on the issue of civil damages. 23 That finding of willfulness
on the part of the child was supported by evidence that he had previ-
ously stolen the keys to the truck.
Prior to the Djouab decision, the courts had consistently followed
a 1977 decision which rejected the assertion of liability on a child who
set fire to a hay stack which eventually caused destruction of an entire
farm. 24 Although some claim that the 1977 decision is still good law
on its facts, the Djouab decision makes it impossible to say with any
degree of confidence that the Assembl6e P16ni~re of the Court of Cas-
sation will look beyond mere objective fault of a child or of a child
victim when an action is grounded in article 1382. The reader only
slightly versed in the subtleties of French delictual liability might
think that these three decisions of the Assembl6e P16ni~re brought to
a close the experiences inaugurated by Desmares, by definitively
adopting the solution which had been used prior to that decision. It
should be recognized, however, that the decisions of the Assembl6e
Plni~re addressed the issue of liability as invoked under article 1382.
It may be argued, therefore, that the ruling in Desmares, being an
action couched in article 1384 section 1, emerges from the decisions of
9 May 1984 unscathed. 25 One can only wonder why, given the simi-
Whoever shall have voluntarily destroyed or damaged the personal or real prop-
erty belonging to another through the use of an explosive or incendiary substance, or
by any other method which by its nature endangers the safety of others, shall be
punished by imprisonment for five to ten years and a fine of not less than five thou-
sand nor more than two hundred thousand francs.
1981 J.C.P. III No. 50907.
121. That general principle is derived from article 64 of the Penal Code, which provides
that "il n'y a ni crime, ni d6lict, lorsque le pr6venu 6tait en 6tat de demence au temps de
raction." (There is neither crime nor delict when the accused was in a state of dementia at the
moment of the action.) CODE PENAL art. 64 (Fr.), 1981 D.S. Chron. 295.
122. Judgment of May 9, 1984, Cass. ass. pl6n., Fr., 1984 D.S. Jur. 528.
123. Id.
124. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1977, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1978 D.S. Informations Rapides 205;
1978 J.C.P. IV 46; 1980 J.C.P. II No. 19339, note Wibault; Barbieri, supra note 8, at 3057,
para. 10.
125. Viney, supra note 3, at 3155, para.1.
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larity of the fact situations, the courts were able to reach such diver-
gent results. Indeed, the coexistence of several regimes for the
determination of liability poses a problem of logical coherence, with
some jurisdictions recognizing the propriety of apportioning responsi-
bility when there is fault on the part of the victim, while other juris-
dictions reject such a division. 26 The distinctions between liability
founded on article 1382 and 1384 section 1 are logically untenable,
and provoke careful reflection on the legal foundations of each pur-
ported solution.
C. 1384 Section 4-Liability Of Guardian
The father and the mother, insofar as they exercise their obligation
as guardian, will be jointly liable for the injury which is caused by
their minor children which live with them.'
27
The recent legal developments wherein liability has been visited
on children and other persons "diporuvu de capacit" exert a wider
influence than merely upon the lives of children and the mentally-
handicapped. There are certain instances in French law where liabil-
ity attaches to third parties merely by virtue of the fact that liability
has been found in another. Such a clause is article 1384 section 4 of
the Civil Code. That clause, after enumerating the persons who will
be responsible for the acts of another, makes clear that for certain
persons, (especially parents, guardians, and artisans), a presumption
of liability will lie. In French law, a father's liability for the injuries
caused by his cohabiting minor flows from his obligation to watch
over and direct that child. 28 In order to give probative value to the
presumption of fault found in this provision, that is, that a parent is
presumed to have committed a fault when his or her child causes
damage to a third person, the legislature linked the provision to the
guardianship provisions (droit de garde) which have traditionally at-
tached to the mother and the father.129
126. Id.
127. Law of June 4, 1970, No. 70-459, C. civ. art. 1384 § 4, 1970 J.C.P. III No. 36698.
128. Id.
129. If an act committed by one person which causes injury to another person is to be
recognized as thefaute of yet a third person who did not commit the act, it is clearly necessary
that the liable party have had the possibility of stopping the act of the first. G. VINEY, supra
note 24, at 965 § 872. It will thus also be necessary to prove an act or an omission committed
by the parents of not preventing the child's injurious act. This presumption of surveillance or
garde lasts until the child reaches eighteen years of age. Id. at § 873. Emancipation of the
child prior to that time, however, negates that presumption. There must also be a lien de
filiation between the author of the injury and the person called upon to respond in damages.
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Although in such a situation the law presumes the father's liabil-
ity, that presumption may be refuted by demonstrating that the father
acted in a reasonably prudent manner, and would not have been in a
position to prevent the child's injurious act. A father will not be liable
for negligent entrustment of an instrumentality to the control of the
child, unless it was forseeable, due to either the instrumentality or the
inexperience of the child, that an injury would occur by virtue of such
entrustment.130 The presumption of liability which is found in article
1384 section 4 requires that the injury be caused by the child. Until
recently, a much more difficult question was whether or not the
child's act must constitute a faute in the classical sense. Tradition-
ally, there was a belief that the act must have been at least unusual
(anormal).131 Although many decisions addressing this issue have
been careful to require a showing of true fault on the part of the child,
the modem trend is definitely away from that stance. 132 For example,
there are a certain number of decisions by the Court of Cassation
which deem it sufficient that the act of the child be "objectively
wrong" (objectivement illicite).133 Although liability predicated on ar-
ticle 1384 section 1 invokes the legal fiction that the child or instru-
mentality within the child's possession remains within the custody
(garde) of the parents, it is also clear that a minor may be found per-
sonally liable as a guardian of objects in his possession, such as a bicy-
cle, gun or dog, provided that he or she has attained the "age of
reason." 134 In the event of such an occurrence, he or she will be per-
sonally liable based on article 1384 section 1 or 1385, without the
plaintiff having to prove actual fault on his or her part. However, as
such children are normally insolvent, a victim will often prefer to
Id. at § 874. Article 1384 establishes another requisite to parental liability for the act of a
child, which is cohabitation. The infant must live with the parent at the moment that the
injury is committed. It is clear, however, that the jurisprudence on this point is expanding the
notion of cohabitation to include grandparents and other third persons. As this communauti
habituelle expands, it is also becoming increasingly clear that the nature of the household will
not be broken by a few hours or even days of absence or displacement. Id. at 968-69, § 876.
130. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1955, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1956 D.S. Chron. 301; 1955 J.C.P. II
No. 9003.
131. By way of comparison with other civil law jurisdictions in germanic law, and in so-
cialist countries, the act must be illicit, which requires more than just abnormal behavior. G.
VINEY, supra note 24, at 965, § 874.
132. Bor6, La Responsabiliti des Parents Pour le Fait des Choses, ou des Animaux Dont
Leur Enfant Mineur a la Garde, 1968 J.C.P. I No. 2180, paras. 9-12.
133. Durry, ResponsabilitdCivile, 73 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 306, 311 (1975); 1978 J.C.P. II
No. 18793, note Batie.
134. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 972, § 878.
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move against the parents under article 1384 section 4. The question
then raised is whether it will be sufficient for the claimant to prove
merely "lefait d'une chose", and rely on the imposition of liability by
mere fact of the instrumentality, or whether the higher standard of
faute on the part of the child must be established. The Second Civil
Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled in 1966 that parents will be
liable even though actual fault on the part of the child has not been
established. 135 Further precision is required. What standard of care
should be exacted from a child "privd de discernment", that is, lack-
ing the mental capacity to understand the consequences of his or her
acts in order for liability to attach? It has been demonstrated that,
traditionally, a person unable to appreciate the probable results of his
or her actions could not be held liable based on a theory of pure fault.
Such a standard approach has also been employed when addressing
the problems of injuries caused by young children who have not yet
attained the "age of reason. ' 13 6 Yet before and after the 1966 deci-
sion mentioned above, there have been other decisions which have
held parents liable under article 1384, if the act was "objectively
wrong."' 137 That theory also applies to injuries caused by mentally-
handicapped children. 38
In 1966 the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation
ruled that the liability of a father under article 1384 section 4 presup-
poses that the liability of the child has already been established. 39
The language of that 1966 decision indicates that as long as the child's
liability has been proved, the court will not concern itself with the
grounds upon which such liability was predicated. The parents' lia-
bility under article 1384 section 4 will lie. Further, liability grounded
under articles 489-2 or 1384 section 1 will suffice to invoke the liabil-
ity of the parents under 1384 section 4.140 These changes reveal that
by a purely spontaneous evolution, the jurisprudence of France has
joined forces with the germanic and socialist jurisdictions which apply
the presumption of fault to those legally responsible for the care of
135. Judgment of Feb. 10, 1966, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1966 Recueil Dalloz Sirey, Sommaires
[D.S. Somm.] 332. "Attendu, en effet que si la responsabiliti du pire suppose que celle de
l'enfant a dti dtablie, la loi ne distingue pas entre les causes qui ont pu donner naissance d la
responsabiliti de l'enfant. " Id. at 335; 1968 J.C.P. II No. 15506.
136. Bor6, supra note 132, at 2180, para. 2; G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 974, § 880.
137. Durry, supra note 133, at 311; G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 971-72, § 877.
138. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 972, § 877.
139. Judgment of Feb. 10, 1966, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1966 D.S. Somm. 332, 335; 1968 J.C.P.
H 15506.
140. G. VINEY, supra note 24, at 975, § 880.
1987]
570 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 9:545
another person, whenever injury is attributable to an act or an omis-
sion which is "anormal" or "illicit", rather than requiring a showing
of fault in the traditional sense.'
4 '
It would be incorrect, however, to think that each time the con-
ditions required for the application of the presumption of 1384 section
4 are met that the father and the mother will necessarily be held
accountable. The presumption is of limited effect. The foundation of
the presumption is that when an infant has caused an injury, it is due
to a fault in the surveillance on the part of the parents. This "fault" is
largely one of improper education. In order for the parents to be re-
leased from this presumption they must carry the burden of proving
either that there was no faute in the education of the child, in the
surveillance of the child's activities, or by breaking the chain of legal
causation according to the requirements of force majeure.1
42
Contemporary jurisprudence tends to admit the cumulative na-
ture of article 1384 section 4, that is, its compatibility with all other
forms of liability, when the requisite elements have been met. For
example, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation has said
that when a child has been penally incriminated, civil actions can be
brought against either the child under article 1382, or the parents
under article 1384 section 4.143 In most instances, however, the liai-
son is between articles 1384 section 4 and 1382 of the civil code. In
that situation, the jurisprudence allows the victim to choose the most
favorable path, and even the right to simultaneously invoke article
1384 section 4 against the parents and article 1382 against the child,
which might result in a judgment in solidum.'"
When the conflict is between article 1384 section 4 and the appli-
cation of articles 1384 section 1 and 1385 for an injury caused by an
instrumentality or an animal, the victim may move directly against
the parents, provided they were exercising the role of "guardian" of
the instrumentality or the animal which caused the damage, employ-
ing article 1384 section 1, 1384 section 4 or 1385.145 When the child
himself was actually in charge of the object or animal, the victim may
invoke the tests cumulatively in order to establish liability on the part
141. Id.
142. Id. at 984, § 890.
143. Id. That case recognized the fact that although a father would not be criminally
liable for the criminal act of his son, that would not preclude a civil action against the father
under article 1384 § 4. Id. at 984 n.137.
144. Id. at 984-85, § 891.
145. Id.
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of the parents, without having to prove the fault of the minor. Often
the parents can escape liability if the injury occurs at school while the
child is under the control of the instituteur or patron.146 If the act was
sufficiently wrong, however, it might be attributed to a faute
d'ducation, in which case the parents would themselves be
inculpated. 147
The inconsistent jurisprudential application of article 1384 sec-
tion 4 is reflected in the frequency with which parents escape liability
under the "pretended fault" theory, on the grounds that they are
nonetheless excellent parents. 148 In addition, the presumption of lia-
bility found in the article receives inconsistent application, depending
upon whether a child is an adolescent or an infant. As a result, vic-
tims remain unsatisfied, and predictability of outcome is reduced to a
fantasy. '49
III. THE LAW OF 5 JULY 1985
It is clear that article 1384, the legislative creation of another
age, needed some adaption to exigencies of modem life. In fact, ef-
forts to amend article 1384 to more ably address the needs of those
injured in automobile accidents are as old as the automobile itself. 150
The necessity of change, having been recognized by judges and gradu-
ally implemented over the course of this century, has now given way
to a legislative avalanche.15' It has been said that the law of 5 July
1985 characterizes the plight of man in Twentieth Century society, by
replacing the first three lines of article 1384 section 1 with forty-eight
new articles.152 The new law has effectively swept away the notions of
force majeure and the intervening acts of a third person (le fait d'un
tiers) which have traditionally acted to limit the liability of one objec-
tively responsible for the injuries arising out of automobile accidents.
146. Id. at 985, § 891.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 986, § 892.
149. Id. at 986-87, § 892.
150. Initial legislative proposals on the subject were made as early as 1906. That proposed
enactment would have added the following two paragraphs to article 1386:
The owner of a motor vehicle is, and without regard to his personal fault, liable for the
damage caused by his vehicle.
The liability can be avoided only by clear proof of grave fault on the part of the victim. 6
BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE D' ETUDES LEGISLATIVES 318 (1907).
151. Cf. Joliet, Le System de Protection Juridictionnelle dans la C.EE., 1985 D.S. Chron.
65.
152. Law of July 5, 1985, No. 85-667, 1985 J.C.P. III No. 57405.
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According to the provisions of that law, no driver of a motor vehicle
may invoke the act of a third person or force majeure to escape liabil-
ity for an accident in which he was involved. 53 In addition to abro-
gating traditional notions of force majeure and le fait d'un tiers, the
new statute has succeeded in relegating the notion of a victim's con-
tributory fault as a mitigating factor, to the realm of the legal archi-
vists. Here are some of its pertinent provisions.
The legislature has not defined the "age of reason" according to
the readings of Tintin or Trebonian.154 For the purposes of the act,
the age of reason is located somewhere between sixteen and seventy
years of age. The legislators have decided that if one is less than six-
teen or more than seventy years of age, or has been certified as being
more than eight per cent handicapped, then one may not be held lia-
ble for one's injuries absent a showing that the actor voluntarily as-
sumed a grave personal risk (dommage volontairement richerche').
55
Such a burden of proof will be virtually impossible to sustain. A
child, an old person, and a handicapped person are thereby legisla-
tively irresponsible for their actions in the realm of automobile acci-
dents. Absent proof that such persons willingly threw themselves in
front of an automobile, they will be indemnified for one hundred per
cent of their damages. 56
Persons between sixteen and seventy years of age, and less than
eighty per cent incapacitated, will be indemnified in spite of their
fault, unless a two-tiered burden of proof can be met. First, the act of
the victim must have amounted to a faute inexcusable, and second,
such faute must have been the exclusive cause of the injury. 1 57 The
questions which such standards engender attend judicial resolution on
a case by case basis. Is it inexcusable to cross a street against a traffic
signal, or for a pedestrian or cyclist to cross a highway? Although the
notion of "inexcusable fault" remains vague, development of the case
law should provide some assistance for future actions. Yet even if
such actions are defined to be inexcusable faults, a second hurdle must
be cleared in order to avoid liability. That fault must also be found to
be the exclusive cause of the accident. Thus, even if the driver of the
153. Id.
154. 1985 G.P. 452.
155. The legislators have succeeded in injecting into the judge's calculus the notion of
"willingly seeking out injury." New interpretations and theories as to the extent of this notion
will undoubtedly flourish. Id.
156. Law of July 5, 1985, No. 85-667, 1985 J.C.P. III No. 57405.
157. Id.
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automobile is found to be speeding or in any slight way contributorily
negligent, the pedestrian or cyclist who inexcusably crossed the street
will be completely indemnified.
The driver of the automobile, however, no matter what his age,
physical or mental status, will not benefit from the new law. He will
continue to recover according to the rules estalished in Desmares and
its progeny. Thus, the driver may not assert the contributory negli-
gence of a victim when that victim sues him for damages, unless that
contributory negligence was so gross as to constitute a force majeure
and thereby shift the element of causation to the victims themselves.
Yet under the new law, the fault committed by the driver will limit or
exclude his indemnity for injuries he has personally sustained. 158 On
the other hand, every victim who has committed a fault will enjoy
complete indemnification. 159 With regard to prejudice par ricochet,160
the damages of those "ayant droit"161 will also be indemnified, ac-
cording to current legislation and jurisprudence.
The logical question to follow the creation of these new "rights"
is "who is going to pay for all of this virtually unlimited recovery?"
To that end, the statute provides that the bills will be paid by the
insurer of the vehicle, but that the insurance company will have re-
course against the insurer of other persons involved. 162 It was in-
tended that the increased financial burdens would fall upon the
insurance companies, rather than the victims directly. In addition, a
special fund known as the "fonds de garantie" will be established for
the purpose of indemnifying those injured by unknown or uninsured
tortfeasors.163 The law of 5 July imposes serious penalties on insur-
ance companies which fail to meet their obligations under the law.
The company will have eight months to offer a payment to the
158. Id. at § I, art. 4.
159. Replacement prostheses, glasses and wheel chairs are exceptions. Id. at § I, art. 5.
160. When a person is injured, those who are close to him sustain, or may sustain, an
indirect injury. This is known as prjudice or dommage d'intidrts, and that category is further
subdivided into dommage matiriel and dommage moral. Dommage matdriel results notably in
the cessation of assistance provided by the deceased, and might be called in English legal terms
"loss of support." Dommage moral is the sadness which is caused by the loss of a loved one,
and might be called "loss of affection" in English. For a detailed analysis of damages in
France, see Catala & Weir, supra note 2, at 678-85.
161. This term, synonomous with the term ayant cause, refers to a person who has a le-
gally secured right, by virtue of a familial relationship (ascendant, descendant or conjugal), or
due to a communal relationship or economic dependancy. R. GUILLEN & J. VINCENT, supra
note 4, at 46.
162. Law of July 5, 1985, No. 85-667 § II, art. 8, 1985 J.C.P. III No. 57405.
163. Id. at § II, art. 9.
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victims. 164
Who will gain from this change in regime? Perhaps the victim.
Surely the social security system. This reform entrains not only a cer-
tain improvement in the indemnification of victims, but also a transfer
of the cost of such indemnity. The law provides for increased indem-
nification for automobile accident victims, and the augmented dis-
bursements will have to be financed one way or another, whether by
the insurance companies, or the social security system. Although
there was testimony by the Garde de Sceaux in hearings before the
Assembl6e Nationale that the ministry for economics and finance
foresaw no increase in insurance rates, 65 such an appraisal would
seem sanguine, if not a blink at reality. The rise in insurance rates,
which is certain to result from the enhanced disbursements, creates a
ripple effect throughout the economy, for as rates are raised, so does
the percentage of non-compliance with mandatory insurance laws
rise. 166 As the portion which remains uninsured will be financed by
the social security system, those payments will be passed on to the
taxpayer, directly or indirectly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional French rule regarding the establishment of liabil-
ity, in existence long before the codification of the Code Napol6on, is
one of subjective fault. This in concreto standard requires an investi-
gation by the finder of fact into the state of mind of the author of the
injury. 1 67 The application of such a hard and fast rule resulted in the
denial of remedy to those who had been injured by children, or men-
tally-handicapped tortfeasors, (considered by the law to be incapable
of committing a "fault"), or in situations where the facts did not con-
clusively establish responsibility (accidents anonymes). The drastic in-
crease in such "faultless accidents" inaugurated by the industrial
revolution, led to a societal recognition that in certain situations lia-
bility should attach in spite of an inability to prove actual fault. 16
8
Thus a new basis for the assignment of liability was created, "respon-
sabilitd pour lafait d'une chose" (article 1384 section 1). This modest
164. Id. at § II, art. 12.
165. Bihr, supra note 11, at 63, 64.
166. Mandatory insurance laws were enacted in France on February 27, 1958. Law of
Feb. 27, 1958, No. 58-208, 1958 Recueil Dalloz, Legislation 124.
167. Mazeaud, La 'faute objective" et la responsabiliti sans faute, 1985 D.S. Chron. 13.
168. Law of Jan. 3, 1968, No. 68-5, C. civ. art. 489-2 (Fr.); 1968 J.C.P. III No. 33756; cf.
Barbieri, supra note 8, at No. 3057.
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acceptance of a theory of risk socialization sounded the death knell
for the institution of pure fault - fault determined in concreto. As
the notion of liability for accidents anonymes under article 1384 sec-
tion 1 expanded, it also affected the way the courts considered liability
under articles 1382 and 1384 section 4. In 1968 the legislature further
diluted the subjective standard of fault, by enacting article 489-2169 of
the civil code, a provision which caused adults with diminished
mental capacities to answer for their torts in the absence of a finding
of true "fault." The victims of persons lacking requisite capacity did
not go unnoticed by the courts as they addressed the claims of those
injured by other persons "legally" immune to the attachment of tradi-
tional "fault," such as those too young to recognize the consequences
of their actions. The most recent legislative nail in the coffin of sub-
jective fault was the law of 5 July 1985,170 which, by abrogating tradi-
tional defenses such as force majeure and independent acts of a third
person (fait d'un tiers), has resulted in the adoption of a standard of
strict liability in the realm of automobile accidents.
Society has historically dictated that each person pay his or her
dues - all that is owed - and no more. 71 Recent developments in
the theory of risk allocation have not succeeded in expunging this
"bronze law of liability" 172 from the collective consciousness. Yet the
modem world is one of vehicles and machines in motion. While in
the past it was considered appropriate that each person bear the bur-
dens for his or her negligent acts, the technical difficulties which at-
tend contemporary efforts to assign liability, together with increasing
reliance on insurance as a diffuser of risk, has resulted in the modifica-
tion of our notions of what is a "reasonable burden." While tradition-
ally there was no question as to the legal propriety of denying all or a
portion of the plaintiff's recovery, due to his or her momentary lapse
of judgment or negligence, evolving theories of risk allocation have
caused a re-examination of those traditional policy considerations.
Efforts to clearly define an act which results in the attachment of civil
liability (fait gendrateur de la responabilitd civile) have been directed
toward the discernment of actual fault (faute dilictuelle) as set out in
articles 1382 et. seq of the Civil Code. Yet as more and more occa-
sions arise where the establishment of pure fault is simply impossible,
169. Law of Jan. 3, 1968, No. 68-5, C. civ. art. 489-2 (Fr.).
170. Law of July 5, 1985, No. 85-667, 1985 J.C.P. III No. 57405.
171. J. INST. 3 (J. Moyle 5th ed. 1912).
172. Judgment of July 21, 1982, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1982 G.P. 391, concl. Charbonnier;
1982 J.C.P. II No. 19861.
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we are called upon to make difficult value judgments. On one hand,
should society permit a victim to be stranded without protection of
any sort on the grounds that fault had not been established? At the
other extreme, is society's role that of ensuring a victim's unlimited
recovery in the absence of the author's proven fault? Indeed, the
gradual merging of notions of fault and risk has resulted in the disap-
pearance of pure fault as a requirement for the imposition of civil
liability in France. As the employment of a pure fault test whereby
civil liability attaches to the author of an injury has disappeared, so
also have the traditional defenses to liability based on fault, such as
force majeure and le fait d'un tiers, fallen into disuse.
It should be recognized that an objective standard of liability will
in no way guaranty a uniformity of outcome. It is clear that many
times it is difficult to differentiate between the objective and subjective
test when assigning liability. For example, should the act of a person
of diminished mental capacity be compared to that of a similarly im-
paired person living in the same community? Should a child of tender
years be measured against the actions of another infant of comparable
age and experience? Certainly not. As these persons are exempt from
liability grounded in "fault," their liability, if any, must be based upon
comparisons with normal, sensible citizens. They will be considered
to have committed a fault when a person of normal sensibilities would
not have acted in the same way. This is exactly what the French Leg-
islature accomplished in the area of liability of mentally-handicapped
adults (diments) in 1968, and what the courts have done to children in
the Nineteen Eighties. 173
Many years age, Professor Carbonnier foresaw the day when so-
ciety itself would mend all of its misfortunes. No such reforms come
without cost, however. He predicted that on that day of universal
recovery, indemnity would be provided, not through insurance, but
rather by society at large, through taxes. It is far too early to predict
whether the benefits of increased and easier recoveries will outweigh
the augmented financial burdens which are certain to result. If one
were to hazard an opinion, however, it might be predicted that to-
day's remnant pretorian notions of fault, in statute and jurisprudence,
will soon be relegated to historical footnote, and that Carbonnier will
have accurately predicted the demise of Delict, a victim of its own
hypertrophy.174
173. 1982 J.C.P. II No. 19861, note Chabas.
174. J. CARBONNIER, supra note 107, at 448-55.
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